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The Role of Nonstandard Workers 
in Client-Organizations
KAREN M.  OLSEN1*
This paper examines the diversity and complexities of
nonstandard work. Two types of nonstandard workers are studied:
workers employed by temporary help agencies (THAs) and 
 contract company workers, both of which are involved in a triadic 
 employment relationship. The analyses are based on interviews 
with managers in three service-sector companies in Norway. The 
paper discusses the dilemmas managers in client-organizations 
face when agency temporaries and contract company workers 
are integrated and do work similar to what is done by the regular 
 workers in the firm. Managers in client-organizations require 
loyalty from nonstandard workers, and under certain conditions, 
nonstandard workers are able to form pressure groups. The 
 findings are discussed in relation to the highly regulated labour 
market in Norway, in a period of labour shortage.
Research on nonstandard work has typically conceptualized 
 organizations and labour markets in terms of a core-periphery division 
(Magnum, Mayoll and Nelson, 1985; Pfeffer, 1994; Lepak and Snell, 2002; 
Matusik and Hill, 1998). The core-periphery model is grounded in the 
assumption that certain tasks or activities in an organization are more vital 
than others. Generally, it is assumed to be advantageous for organizations
that core functions be undertaken by regular workers who enjoy continuous 
employment, while peripheral activities may be performed by workers who 
are loosely connected to the organization, such as nonstandard workers. 
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However, increasingly, firms are found to use non-standard workers also 
in core activities and integrated with regular workers (e.g. Lautsch, 2002; 
Gramm and Schnell, 2001; Smith, 2001). This development has encouraged 
research concerning consequences of non-standard work for managers and 
co-workers in the client-organizations (Connelly and Gallagher, 2004). 
In this paper, I show how the use of agency temporaries and contract 
company workers raises dilemmas for commitment, loyalty and power 
relations in the client-organizations. The study is conducted in a regulated 
labour market, which provides a new context to the existing literature of 
nonstandard work.
During the last decade, the use of nonstandard work, such as temporary 
help agencies (THAs) and contract work, has increased in many industrial 
nations (De Grip, Hoevenberg and Willems, 1997; Carnoy, Castells and 
Benner, 1997; Lee, 1996; Kalleberg, Reynolds and Marsden, 2003). Many 
THAs have expanded their range of services, increasingly providing sub-
contracting services that were previously dominated by contract companies. 
The increase of professionals in THAs has lessened the stigmatization of 
these workers and increased their social status (Barker and Christensen, 
1998). In the service industry, in particular, the large increase in the use of 
subcontracting and agency temporaries (Clinton, 1997) has made this sector 
particularly appropriate for studying nonstandard workers.
The use of nonstandard work arrangements, such as workers involved in 
triadic employment relations, is found to influence the client-organizations, 
often in unintended ways. The complexities in the employment relationship 
are found to produce dilemmas and challenges in managing non-standard 
workers (Rubery et al., 2003, 2004; Ward et al., 2001; Ang and Slaughter, 
2001; Connelly and Gallagher, 2003). Furthermore, workers in triadic 
employment relationship, such as agency temporaries and contract company 
workers are found to develop dual commitment, sharing commitment 
both to their agency and their client (Liden et al., 2003; McKeown, 2003; 
Rubery et al., 2003). Lastly, the composition of non-standard and regular 
workers in the firm is found to influence the regular workers’ loyalty and 
behaviour (Davis-Blake, Broschak and George, 2003; Chattopadhyay and 
George, 2001). This research was mainly restricted to the United Kingdom, 
United States, Canada, and Australia within the distinct institutional  setting
of Anglo-Saxon culture where there are few labour market regulations 
 (particularly in the U.S. and UK) and greater freedom for employers to 
choose employment arrangements.
In this paper, I use qualitative interviews from three case companies 
to examine the diversity in nonstandard work. I find that firms use agency 
temporaries, and contract company workers work in the core, integrated with 
regular workers, that managers question the loyalty of nonstandard workers, 
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and that nonstandard workers constitute latent power-groups. The paper is 
organized in the following way. Fist, I compare the institutional setting of 
Norway with Anglo-Saxon countries. Second, I summarize some of the 
main literature on organizations’ use of nonstandard work, and present the 
method and the cases. Finally, I present the analyses, which is followed by 
a discussion and conclusion.
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Organizations’ use of agency temporaries and contract work depends, in 
part, on institutional factors, such as labour law, regulations governing trade 
union influence, employment protection, and the operation of THAs. To 
grasp the wider context in which organizations are embedded, some vital 
dimensions of the institutional setting in Norway are presented. I am not 
able to examine the effects of institutional context, only having data from 
one country. However, the description provides a basis for comparing the 
institutional setting in Norway to some Anglo-Saxon countries, from which 
the major part of the literature on non-standard work derives.
TABLE 1
Institutional Setting and Temporary Employment in Norway and Four 
Anglo-Saxon Countries
Regulations
on THA
(2000)1
EPL2
ranking
(1 = least strict)
Union density
(2000)2
%
Temporary
employment
(2000)1
%
Norway limited by reason
for hiring 21 54 10
United Kingdom no regulations  2 31  7
Canada no regulations  3 28 13
United States no regulations  1 13  4
Australia no regulations  6 25  6
Note:
1. OECD (2002), Vosko (1998).
2. OECD (2004).
Table 1 compares the institutional setting in Norway to the United 
Kingdom, Canada, the U.S., and Australia. The institutional setting in 
Norway shares characteristics that may both encourage and discourage the 
use of non-standard forms of labour.
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Two factors may encourage firms to use nonstandard workers in 
Norway. First, strict employment protection legislation (EPL) (i.e. obstacles 
to terminating open-ended contracts) is believed to make employers prefer 
fixed-term contracts that are less costly to terminate (Lee, 1996). Table 1 
shows that the EPL in Norway is ranked as stricter than all the four Anglo-
Saxon countries. Second, the welfare system in Norway provides workers 
with substantial access to leave of absence which produces a need for fill-in 
persons, such as temporary employment (Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004).
Certain factors may also discourage the use of nonstandard workers 
in Norway. Unlike Canada, but like many other European countries, the 
temporary help industry in Norway is regulated (Vosko, 1998; Evju, 2003).1
Hiring-out of manpower is permitted, although there are certain restric-
tions on the user enterprise (Evju, 2003).2 Nevertheless, the operation of 
THAs and contract companies in Norway is, as in many other countries, 
dominated by a few, large, international companies. As in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, there are no restrictions on the access to using workers from 
contract companies in Norway.
Nonstandard work arrangements have enabled firms to adjust their 
workforces more easily to uncertain market demands, and to save on 
labour costs (Lautsch, 2002). As all residents receive health insurance 
in Norway, the potential to save on fringe benefits by using nonstandard 
workers is of less importance than in many other countries. Norway has a 
national sickness benefit scheme, and all employees—including employees 
of temporary help agencies and contract workers employed by a contract 
company—are entitled to pay during sickness. (Consequently, workers 
employed by these employment intermediaries have, in principle, the same 
rights as other employees.3) Nevertheless, the need for firms to adapt to 
market changes is widespread, and this is also the case in Norway. The 
reported reasons for using agency temporaries and contract company 
 workers, such as adjusting to seasonal changes, screening for recruitment, 
and special expertise are prevalent in Norway (Olsen, 2005), as in the U.S. 
(Houseman, 2001).
For workers, non-standard work arrangements typically imply greater 
job insecurity and unions generally oppose these arrangements. Norway 
is often labelled a corporatist country (Høgsnes, 1994), in which labour 
1. In the UK, recent legislative changes have been made to increase the rights of agency 
temporaries; however, there are no restrictions on the access for firms to use this form 
of labour (Ward et al., 2001).
2. Before 2000, the THAs were permitted to hire out workers in the “office sector”.
3. As certain benefits (e.g. pension rights) depend on seniority, workers on fixed-term 
contract are at higher risk for being excluded.
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is strong and collective bargaining is widespread. Table 1 shows that 
57 percent of workers are union members. This is lower than the other 
Scandinavian countries, but higher than most Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Despite the relatively high unionization in Norway, the use of temporary 
employment is common. Table 1 shows that 10 percent of the workforce has 
temporary employment, which is lower than in Canada and higher than the 
UK, the U.S. and Australia. Table 1 shows only the numbers for temporary 
workers in general, and not for employees of employment intermediar-
ies (such data have apparently not yet been compiled). In summary, the 
institutional setting in Norway is distinct from the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
although some of the motivations to use agency temporaries and contract 
company workers are the same.
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON NONSTANDARD WORK
Defining Nonstandard Work
In this paper I examine a certain type of nonstandard workers, those 
employed by means of employment intermediaries. Two main categories 
of employment intermediaries are studied: (1) Workers from temporary 
help agencies (THA), who are employed by the THA but supervised by 
the  client-organization, and (2) contract company workers who are both 
employed and directed by the contract company.4 It is the employment 
intermediary that has employer responsibility and pays the salary of both 
these types of workers. Unlike regular (standard) workers, these workers 
are involved in a triadic relationship, having their employer outside the 
 client-organization.5 The theoretical differences between agency temporaries 
and contract company workers relates to who directs their work (Kalleberg, 
2000); however, in practice the way in which the supervision and direction 
takes place in client-organizations may be less clear.
The term non-standard work embraces several specific forms of work 
arrangements and employment relations (see Kalleberg, 2000). The down-
side of using terms such as “non-standard” and “contingent”, is that they 
may blur the diversity of the particular employment relations they try to 
4. Whereas, independent contractors are self-employed, contract company workers are 
employed by a contract company.
5. Both of these groups of workers may consist of full-time or part-time workers, and they 
are heterogeneous in terms of profile. Women and young people are over-represented 
among agency temporaries in Scandinavian countries, including Norway, as well as in 
Canada (OECD, 2002). In this study, the contract workers consist of highly educated, 
technical experts (see Table 2), whereas agency temporaries generally are less educated 
than the contract workers.
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capture. The meaning of these terms has been questioned. For instance, 
Polivka and Nardone (1989) showed how the term contingent originally was 
understood as lack of attachment between the workers and the employer. 
However, the operational definition has included part-time workers who 
may have secure employment. As both workers employed by a contract 
company or a THA may have an open-ended contract (although, also in 
Norway the large majority of workers employed by THAs have a fixed-
term contract, see Torp, Schøne and Olsen, 1998), the term contingent may 
be misleading. The advantage of the term nonstandard is that it does not 
necessarily imply low job security for workers.
Nonstandard Workers in High-Skilled, Core Jobs
Much of the recent literature has contested the previously stereotyped 
picture of non-standard workers as low-skilled, “secondary”, and only taking 
care of peripheral tasks. Although the early studies on nonstandard workers 
traditionally focused on low-skilled workers (Rogers, 1995; Geary, 1992; 
Barnett and Miner, 1992; Nollen, 1996), an increasing number of studies 
have included higher skilled workers, such as technical and professional 
IT contractors (Ang and Slaughter, 2001; Kunda, Barley and Evans, 2002; 
McKeown, 2003) and lawyers (Rogers, 2000).
As the high-skilled side of nonstandard work increasingly has come 
into focus, it has been discovered that the tasks of nonstandard workers 
are not always peripheral. For instance, firms are found to use temporary 
workers and contract workers in their core activities (Gramm and Schnell, 
2001; Nesheim, 2001). One recent theoretical framework suggests that under 
certain conditions, such as in very dynamic environments, a limited number 
of contingent workers in core-value creation activities may be advantageous 
to the client-organization, creating a competitive advantage (Matusik and 
Hill, 1998). Furthermore, Lautsch (2002) develops a theoretical framework 
showing that there are systematic differences in nonstandard jobs due to 
management strategies and work practices. When nonstandard workers are 
used to enhance flexibility, these workers are more likely to be integrated 
with the regular workers, more so than when cost-saving purposes are the 
main motivation.
As temporary and regular workers are found to often work side-by-side 
and in teams (Smith, 2001), the picture of these workers as inferior to regular 
workers is challenged (Matusik and Hill, 1998). Kunda, Barley and Evans 
(2002) found that although high-skilled contract workers do face some of 
the same uncertainty as traditional temporary workers, they have far more 
autonomy and choices for further employment, and are sometimes better 
paid than permanent employees.
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Loyalty and Commitment of Nonstandard Workers
The triadic relationship in which agency temporaries and contract 
 workers must deal makes organizational commitment complex (Connelly 
and Gallagher, 2003). Who should these nonstandard workers feel loyalty 
to: their client or their employer? Recent literature shows that workers 
assigned by temporary agencies are found to show dual commitment, 
 sharing  commitment both to their temporary help agency and their client 
(Liden et al., 2003). McKeown (2003) found that sometimes, contractors 
tended to show stronger commitment to their client than to the agency.
Generally, workers that show strong commitment to the organization are 
considered more motivated to perform well. However, non-standard workers 
enable firms to more easily adapt to changes in the market (Atkinson, 
1985). This implies that commitment and loyalty are less important 
and that mangers in client-organizations may not even want committed
nonstandard workers. Thus, the lack of commitment of non-standard 
 workers may be regarded as a trade-off, with these workers’ providing the 
shifting manpower-needs of the client-organization.
Much of the existing research suggests there is little difference between 
regular employees and contractors in terms of organizational commitment 
and work involvement (to the client-organization) (Pearce, 1993; Galup et 
al., 1997). However, to managers in client-organizations, the issue of loyalty 
among nonstandard workers is often regarded as problematic. Managers 
are found to be concerned by the lack of loyalty among agency staff and 
contractors (Grimshaw et al., 2001; Ang and Slaughter, 2001).
Tensions in Client-Organization
The presence of nonstandard workers produces a number of conse-
quences for the client-organization. The use of non-standard workers is 
found to affect the loyalty of the regular workers within the firm (Davis-
Blake, Broschak and George, 2003). Davis-Blake et al. (2003) found that 
a blended workforce of standard and nonstandard workers worsened the 
relationship between managers and employees, and decreased the loyalty 
of standard workers. Geary (1992) found that the use of temporary workers
gave rise to a number of tensions and disadvantages for the client firm, for 
instance, that regular workers “ordered” the temporaries around. Also, the 
composition of non-standard workers and regular workers has consequences 
for behavioural outcomes. The difference in statuses (temporary versus 
internal workers) had negative effects on internal workers when work 
groups were dominated by temporary workers (Chattopadhyay and George, 
2001).
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Workers hired through an employment intermediary are involved 
in complex employment relations. Rubery et al. (2004) showed how the 
 complexities in inter-organizational employment relationships presented 
barriers to applying consistent policies to managing workers. Ward et al. 
(2001) found that the use of agency temporaries constituted a conflict with 
other corporate goals. The agency workers represented a large proportion 
of the total workforce, which created contradictions for the local managers, 
and ultimately created management problems.
METHOD AND DATA
Research Setting
This study is based on interviews with managers in three  organizations. 
Emphasizing the views of managers in client-organizations provides a 
fruitful basis for understanding the many facets of the nonstandard work 
phenomenon. As the service industries experience rapid growth and stand 
out as having disproportionately high use of agency temporaries and 
contract workers, the context for studying the use of nonstandard work is 
promising.6
The three organizations are selected due to their diversities as well 
as their similarities. Selecting more than one organization increases the 
diversity, while selecting organizations within the same industry controls 
for some variation (Eisenhardt, 1989). All three organizations belong to the 
service industries, including two from the financial sector and one from 
telecommunications.
FINANCE-I and FINANCE-II are insurance companies with 600 and
1,100 employees respectively. Insurance, banking, and investment-products 
constitute their main business areas. Both companies had been through 
processes of downsizing during the 1990s. The main activities in both 
companies were to sell and process insurance and banking products. The 
average age of employees was about 40 years in both companies. Selecting 
two similar organizations (FINANCE-I and FINANCE-II) allowed me to 
 examine whether there were differences in the use of nonstandard work 
despite similarities in organizational characteristics.
TELECOM was a telecommunications company (non-unionized) founded 
in 1996 and the number of employees was 430. Telecommunications has 
6. For example, among 230 establishments in the financial sector in Norway, 61 percent use 
workers from THAs, and 86 percent use contract companies. The corresponding numbers 
for a representative sample of establishments are respectively, 30 percent and 71 percent 
(Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004). 
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been a growing industry, and TELECOM was one of the new competitors of 
the previously publicly owned company that had had a monopoly in the 
 telecom market. TELECOM had a young workforce, the average age being 
about 33-34 years. The recession in the information technology sector hit 
TELECOM particularly hard and led to its bankruptcy in the fall of 2001. 
According to analysts, the operation of TELECOM was too capital- intensive, 
and management had taken on too large a financial risk (Dagens Næringsliv,
2001). The company had increased the number of employees very quickly. 
The significant use of agency temporaries and contract workers may not 
directly have caused the bankruptcy, although it may be an indication 
of a company that was trying to grow too fast without having a clear 
 strategy.7
The three cases differ on degree of unionization. The two financial 
companies were relatively highly unionized, whereas the Telecom was 
non-unionized. The share of unionized workers was 70 percent in FINANCE-I 
and 55 percent in FINANCE-II.
Although there are significant differences between the financial sector 
and telecommunications, they have some similar features: they both depend 
heavily on advanced information technology systems, and access to this 
expertise was limited in the period of this study (2000). (The unemploy-
ment rate was low at the time: 3.5 percent, see SSB, 2004b.) In all three 
 companies, the staffs ranged from lower clerical workers to highly skilled 
computer programmers and mathematicians. The majority of regular 
employees in these companies had, to some extent, similar educational 
backgrounds, with 2–4 years of business administration studies being 
common.
Data Collection
I conducted interviews with 28 persons in three case-companies; 20 
of the interviews were semi-structured face-to-face interviews with top- 
middle- and lower level managers and union-representatives (all recorded 
and transcribed) (five interviews in FINANCE-I, eleven in FINANCE-II and 
four in TELECOM). All of these took place in the client-organizations during 
2000, and the interviews lasted on average one hour. The other eight were 
telephone interviews or shorter face-to-face interviews (not recorded) (three 
interviews in FINANCE-I, two in FINANCE-II and three in TELECOM), and often 
supplied with e-mail correspondence. At TELECOM, the data collection had 
to stop at an earlier point than planned due to bankruptcy.
7. Several respondents argued this to be the case.
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The interview guide consisted of two main groups of questions
(1) arguments and reasons for using agency temporaries and contract 
workers, and if there had been any recent changes, if so, why etc., and
(2) experiences with the use of these workers, which work tasks were done 
by nonstandard workers versus regular workers, and what challenges the 
managers faced by having both regular and contract workers in their unit. 
The interviews and documentary information were coded, first within- and 
then across cases, separately for agency temporaries and contract workers.8
In the analyses that follow, the term nonstandard workers refers to both 
agency temporaries and to contract workers.
Nonstandard Work in the Three Cases
Table 2 shows the number of agency temporaries and contract  workers.
The use of agency temporaries and contract workers may be regarded as 
being institutionalized in both FINANCE-I and FINANCE-II. Both  companies 
had ongoing arrangements with THAs and contract-companies to provide 
them with personnel, and the decision on when to use agency temporaries
was decentralized. The authority to use contract workers was more 
 centralized in all three companies,9 which was due to the higher costs 
related to these workers. The use of agency temporaries had been rela-
tively stable in both FINANCE-I and FINANCE-II for the previous five years. 
Their assignments might be as short as one week, although the majority 
of assignments lasted approximately six months. TELECOM had by far the 
most agency temporaries and contract workers, and in 2000 they constituted 
close to one third of the total workforce. (In their own terms, they called 
them “externals”, implying that these people had their employer outside 
TELECOM.) In the two financial companies, the overall use was modest, 
although these workers constituted a considerable proportion within certain 
departments of the organizations.
In all the companies, the agency temporaries and contract workers
were located at the client organizations’ premises. Reducing the number 
of both agency temporaries and contract workers was an explicit goal in 
TELECOM, while reducing the number of agency temporaries was of some 
importance in FINANCE-I. In FINANCE-II, the number of agency temporaries
or contract workers was not an issue of discussion, either at corporate level 
or at lower levels in the organization. This may have to do with the fact 
8. The program NUDIST was used for coding the information.
9. Unfortunately, I was not able to get an interview with the IT-manager in FINANCE-I.
However, the use of contract workers was of minor importance, because the company 
was provided with IT-expertise from its owner-company.
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that there were not so many nonstandard workers in the organization at 
the time, and that FINANCE-II had faced major organizational changes in 
other respects.
TABLE 2
Number of Agency Temporaries and Contract Company Workers
in the Three Companies
Agency
temporaries
Contract
company
workers
Number
of regular
workers
Ratio
nonstandard/regular
Finance-I 80  8-10  560 0.16
Finance-II 30 35-40 1100 0.06
Telecom 44 141  430 0.43
Note: The numbers represent averages at one point in time, for FINANCE-I: March 2000, 
FINANCE-II: May 2000, and TELECOM: September 2000.
The majority of workers from temporary help agencies worked in the 
Customer-service (“Call-centers”) in both financial companies. In TELECOM,
agency temporaries were also used in this unit, in addition to many other 
units. The majority of contract workers worked in technical departments (IT-
support, -implementation and -development) in TELECOM and FINANCE-II.
IT-development is specific to each company, and both in FINANCE-II and 
in TELECOM, contract workers were involved in developing IT-solutions. In 
TELECOM, even the person that was responsible for developing IT-strategy 
worked for a contract company.
ANALYSIS OF THE THREE CASES
Nonstandard Workers in Core Functions
Table 3 provides a definition and description of agency temporaries and 
contract workers used in the three firms. The three companies gave two main 
reasons for using agency temporaries: to adjust to variable labour demand 
(absentees and peak periods) and to screen workers for regular positions. 
One of the assumed advantages of using nonstandard work is that their 
skills are generic, and do not need to be firm specific. However, it became 
apparent that the work that the agency temporaries do requires certain skills. 
This is reflected in the amount of training. Three to four months of training 
is common in Customer-service in FINANCE-II.
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In all three companies, the policy was to have contract workers do 
work that required special expertise (Table 3). This was a consistent 
answer among all the respondents. The contract workers within IT were 
intended to either support the regular workforce by doing routine work or 
to be involved in specific projects that were not part of the regular tasks. 
Policy and practice collide here, which became increasingly apparent when 
I talked to lower managers that had more direct contact with the agency 
temporaries and contract workers. Almost half of the respondents stated 
that agency temporaries and contract workers often did the same work as 
regular employees.10
In principle one should lease workers that should work on more basic routine
work. This is hard to accomplish, so in fact we lease workers within all 
areas. . . . it is . . . we leased [contract] workers to do routine tasks, but in 
reality this can be hard (middle manager about the use of contract workers 
within IT, FINANCE-II).
The fact that contract workers held critical positions in the client 
 organization was particularly apparent in TELECOM. Even one of the 
managers of a large unit was an independent contract worker, which was 
considered a major problem.
In FINANCE-I and TELECOM, nonstandard workers often had long-term 
assignments. Agency temporaries had sometimes been in the client firm for 
as long as two years. “This implies that they really fill a regular position,
more than time limited projects or tasks” (middle manager, TELECOM). 
It is the worker that is temporary, not the job, following Smith’s (2001) 
argument. TELECOM had detailed statistics on the number of nonstandard 
workers as a means to visualize how great their problem was. About half 
of the agency temporaries and contract workers (a total of 185) filled 
regular positions (by TELECOM’s own definition), while the other half had 
temporary tasks. More than half of the agency temporaries and contract 
workers had been in the company for more than seven months, which was 
partly due to difficulties in obtaining qualified labour for regular positions, 
particularly within information technology. In TELECOM, the aim was to 
have contract workers work on projects that were limited in time, which 
was often not accomplished. One example is when an IT-manager (contract 
worker) started on a three months’ assignment, and ended up staying in the 
organization for 18 months.
In all the three case-companies, neither the agency temporaries nor the 
contract workers were segregated from the regular workers—they worked 
side-by-side and often on projects and teams together. Contract workers 
10. This was not without controversy. Sometimes contingent workers held positions that 
the regular workers (and unions) thought they should have.
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and agency temporaries can even be head of a project or team. The staff-
ing of projects was estimated in FINANCE-II to be 10–30 percent contract 
workers. In TELECOM it could be as high as 100%. In both FINANCE-II and 
TELECOM, it was common for contract workers to be team/project leaders.
The agency temporaries, contract workers and regular workers were 
largely integrated in terms of attending meetings and arrangements in all 
three companies.
Temporaries attend the same meetings as the regulars. I try to involve them 
[agency temporaries] in most things. . . . that they attend meetings and gather-
ings and so forth. We are very dependent on them, so we try and include them 
whenever we can (lower manager, FINANCE-I).
Nonstandard Workers and Loyalty
The theoretical distinction between agency temporaries and contract 
workers is that contract workers are instructed by their employer and not by 
the client-company (Kalleberg, 2000; Table 3). In practice, this distinction 
is more blurred, which was particularly evident in TELECOM. In TELECOM
the contract workers had little contact with their employer, sometimes not 
even on a monthly basis. This was a result of the company using the contract 
workers for the same work as regular employees, and not as intended, which 
was to use them for special projects. It was also evident in FINANCE-II that 
the client-organization directed the contract workers, and not the employer 
(the contract company).
The loyalty of nonstandard workers came into question in these 
 companies. This was particularly regarded as a problem in TELECOM. One 
respondent puts this rhetorically “does their loyalty follow their own firm 
or our company?” showing the complexity of the triadic employment 
 relationship. The lack of loyalty was exemplified by one personnel  director: 
a project leader, who was an agency temporary, quit, giving less than a 
week’s notice, and started working for one of TELECOM’s subcontractors.
When agency temporaries and contract workers stayed in the client-
firms for long periods of time, they managed to acquire valuable knowledge 
of the firm, and social relations were sometimes strong with the regular 
workers. Sometimes the agency temporaries treated the client-firm as their 
employer, which was also apparent in FINANCE-II.
They regard us almost as their employer; it is just some lists of working hours 
[to the temporary help agency]. But I am very concerned that the feedback 
from the agency should also be there. Most of them have not had previous 
temp-assignments, so they do not really have a relationship with the agency. 
This is a problem for us sometimes. They start bringing things to us that they 
really should speak to the agency about, so we have to guide them a little too 
(lower manager, FINANCE-II).
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Quite a few of the managers regarded lack of loyalty among
nonstandard workers as problematic. This may be explained by the fact that 
the agency temporaries and contract workers are not that easily  replaceable,
having critical positions and doing largely the same work as regular workers. 
“The downside is the loyalty [of the agency temporaries] . . . if you have 
someone that works two months and has high skills . . . you risk losing 
them” (lower manager, FINANCE-I). One example from Telecom can also 
illustrate this:
We have even had cases where the manager has had responsibility for the 
budget and also has been a contract worker and leased a lot of persons from 
his own company, and really had it going. That is not good (lower manager, 
TELECOM).
FINANCE-II was aware of its vulnerability in using contract workers 
and the company had a clear policy on when to use contract workers—
 generally for projects, not in regular positions. Despite this not being fully 
 accomplished, there seemed to be few problems in regard to the use of 
agency temporaries and contract workers in this company. One aspect that 
was mentioned as a potential source of conflict was that the control and 
maintenance of a service might be harder when having contract workers. 
One of the managers stated that regular workers have greater possibilities 
to understand the market-needs, understand the real needs and develop 
solutions internally (as opposed to agency temporaries/contract workers). 
This may be interpreted as “architectural knowledge”, which relates to 
knowledge concerning the whole (Matusik and Hill, 1998).
Tensions and Complex Power Relations
Having nonstandard workers in the client-firms produced certain 
 tensions. According to some managers and to one union representative 
in FINANCE-I, the regular workers had complained about the agency 
 temporaries being too integrated. In an internal note to the personnel 
department from the union representative, some of the complaints were as 
follows: the agency temporaries boss around the regular employees, they 
learn tasks too quickly, they refuse to train the regular workers, and they 
have too critical positions in introducing the new work processes.11 This 
may be an illustration of “periphery” workers getting too close to the core, 
making the core-workers feel threatened. I asked why agency temporaries 
trained regular workers. This happened occasionally. The lower manager 
11. “New work processes” was a re-organization that aimed to make work-tasks run more 
efficiently and smoothly. There was also a goal of making jobs redundant. To avoid 
laying off any of the regular employees when the change processes were completed, 
the estimated reduction of positions was filled with agency temporaries. 
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in FINANCE-I explained that, when the agency temporaries have been in 
the company for a long time, and a new regular worker is recruited for 
a position, the agency temporaries would refuse to train the new worker. 
However, managers were aware of the tensions this could create and tried 
to avoid this situation.
In FINANCE-I, managers emphasized that regular employees  sometimes
appeared as the weaker part compared to agency temporaries. The 
 personnel manager in FINANCE-I describes the agency temporaries as the 
“next generation of workers”. They are flexible, and they often grasp the 
 technology more quickly than regular employees. One middle manager 
put it this way:
It is not many of the regular employees, which have been here for like . . . 37 
years that think it is fun that an agency temp learns and understands and grasps 
the tasks after a few weeks. And that has happened . . . 
In introducing new work methods, the regular workers, who were 
generally older than the agency temporaries, had more trouble using
IT-based tools.
What was the biggest problem for the regular workers was easy for the agency 
temporaries . . . and that they [agency temporaries] have to teach the old ones 
[regular workers] everything with the new processes—that is the biggest 
problem for them . . . (middle manager).
The new work processes also implied that regular workers might lose 
power in terms of knowledge. Knowledge that previously was exclusive to 
some workers would now be available to everyone.
Under certain conditions, nonstandard workers constitute a power 
group within the client-organization. In customer-service (FINANCE-I ), 
the manager found that the agency temporaries at some point became a 
pressure group. “When you have many [agency temporaries] at the same 
time, they can become a pressure group” (lower manager, FINANCE-I). 
“We had 14-15 agency temporaries that we were totally dependent on to 
make a good result”. These constituted half the workforce in this particular 
unit, and their contract at the client firm would stop at a predefined point. 
From this date, they were promised regular positions at the client firm, 
which they were also offered. However, these agency temporaries became 
a pressure group, threatening to quit, not wanting a regular position unless 
wages were increased. This shows that resistance from agency temporaries 
may be collective, and not always individualized (Rogers, 2000; Gottfried, 
1992). In certain circumstances, as in FINANCE-I, they can actually form a 
power group.
The use of nonstandard workers caused problems in some respects, 
despite the fact that the work tasks they performed were largely satisfactory 
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to the client firm. In using contract workers, the greatest problems were 
related to costs. In TELECOM, there were incidences of high-priced contract 
workers doing routine work for which they were over-qualified. As the costs 
related to a contract worker were up to three times that of regular employees 
(see Table 3), this was considered a major problem.
DISCUSSION
Complex Employment Relations
Two findings deserve particular attention. First, I find that managers are 
starting to question the loyalty of nonstandard workers. Second, and some-
what surprisingly, I find that under certain conditions, agency temporaries 
are able to form pressure groups. Both of these findings can be explained, 
in part, by the complexities of the triadic employment relationship and in 
part, by the composition of the workforces.
The question of loyalty is connected to the fact that these nonstandard 
workers had their employer outside the client-organizations. Often, this was 
the only aspect that distinguished these workers from the regular workers 
in the client-organizations. The nonstandard workers being integrated and 
sharing tasks with regular workers accentuated the potential loyalty conflict. 
Furthermore, the composition of the workforce, with nonstandard workers 
constituting a substantial part of the workforce created concerns of loyalty. 
In TELECOM, the vast amount of nonstandard workers enforced a sense of 
lack of control, making managers particularly aware of the potential loyalty 
conflicts.
In one of the companies (FINANCE-I), agency temporaries were able 
to form a pressure group. In forming the pressure groups, two dimensions 
were important. First, one important condition was the fact that these agency 
temporaries were hired at the same point in time. This reinforced their 
perception of common interests, and a shared image of their relationship 
to the temporary help agency. The second condition was that the agency 
temporaries constituted half the workforce in this work unit. As they shared 
the tasks of the regular workers, the client-organization became dependent 
on the nonstandard workforce. The use of agency temporaries in FINANCE-I
and FINANCE-II shared resemblance. However, FINANCE-II had a policy 
that no more than 10–15 percent of the workers in the call-center should 
be agency temporaries, which may explain why this company did not 
 experience agency temporaries forming pressure groups. Thus, despite 
similarities in these organizations, the policy regarding composition of the 
workforce produces different outcomes.
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Institutional Setting
Many of these findings are in line with recent literature on  nonstandard 
work from Anglo-Saxon countries, showing that nonstandard workers 
 created problems of loyalty and challenges for mangers (Rubery et al., 2003, 
2004; Ward et al., 2001; Ang and Slaughter, 2001; Connelly and Gallagher, 
2003). Although comparative analyses should be conducted in order to 
make any strong conclusions, the similarities may indicate that employers 
in nations with different institutional settings have similar policies towards 
nonstandard workers. For instance, common trends are found in employers’ 
use of part-time work, despite the institutional differences between Britain 
and Australia (Walsh, 1997).
Despite similarities in these findings, the institutional setting needs 
some elaboration. In Norway there is little potential for organizations to 
save on fringe benefits by using nonstandard workers, because important 
benefits, such as health insurance, are based on residency and not on 
employment status. The reasons given for using agency temporaries in the 
case companies were related to peak periods, absences, and screening for 
recruitment, and not low-cost objectives. In line with Lautsch (2002), I find 
that when reasons do not relate to low-cost objectives, nonstandard workers 
tend to be integrated with the regular workers.
Although the low-cost strategy (low pay and avoidance of fringe 
 benefits) is less evident in Norway because of the universal benefit system, 
this is not to say that cost-saving strategies are absent. Having the ability to 
screen workers before hiring for regular positions was emphasized as a way 
to save on costs in the long run, particularly in FINANCE-I and FINANCE-II,
which both had been gradually downsizing the workforce over the previous
few years.
At the time of the study, the use of agency temporaries or contract 
company workers was not a topic of discussion in the unions. This may 
have had to do with the companies facing other organizational changes at the 
time. There was sign of ambivalence in how unions regarded non-standard 
workers. On the one hand, unions aimed to keep the number of nonstandard 
workers low. On the other side, they acknowledged some of the benefits 
of having these workers in the organizations, for example, easing work 
 pressure and serving as a buffer for the regular workers (see also Olsen, 
2005). The greatest problems associated with the nonstandard workers were 
found in the non-unionized company. However, explaining these problems 
due to lack of unions in the workplace appears to be overly simplistic.
Labour Market Situation
The demand for contract workers in the information technology  industry 
was great at the time of the study. This particularly caused difficulty in 
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recruiting highly-qualified labour within technical professions. This was 
a major problem in TELECOM, which was trying to recruit more workers 
for regular positions. In the two financial companies, which both had been 
through processes of downsizing, this was less of a problem.
With regard to recruitment, there were differences between agency 
temporaries and contract company workers. While agency temporaries 
often wanted regular positions at the client-firm, working for a contract 
company was considered attractive employment. This made several 
 managers in the client-organizations express fear towards loosing workers 
to more attractive jobs in the contract work industry. (Notably, there are 
no restrictions in Norway on firms’ access to raising wages in order to get 
more qualified labour.) This enabled contract workers to pick and choose 
the more interesting and well-paid jobs, making regular employment at 
the client-organizations less attractive, which shows how the tight labour 
market situation challenges firms in managing workers whose skills are in 
great demand (Cappelli, 1999).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows some of the complexities and diversity in nonstandard 
work. I find that agency temporaries and contract workers are often used 
in vital activities; they are largely integrated with regular workers and 
sometimes hold critical positions. In these companies, there is no clear 
distinction between core and nonstandard jobs. In this context, managers 
require loyalty of nonstandard workers, and nonstandard workers are able 
to develop pressure groups in client-organizations. The findings can, in 
part, be explained by the nature of the triadic employment relationship. 
As these workers have their employer outside their client-firms, managers 
in the client-firms sometimes become unsure of their loyalty. Also, the 
 composition of these workforces has an impact on loyalty and the latent 
power of agency temporaries. When nonstandard workers constitute a 
substantial amount of the workforces, issues of loyalty and power relations 
become more pronounced.
The findings support the recent literature on nonstandard work, showing 
that nonstandard workers are not always inferior or taking care of peripheral 
tasks. The institutional setting of Norway adds force to this finding. As 
benefits are based universally in Norway, there is little potential for firms 
to save on costs. This implies that nonstandard workers, such as agency 
temporaries and contract company workers, receive in principle, the same 
benefits as regular workers, making these jobs not necessarily “bad” jobs. 
This has implications for the theoretical concept of nonstandard work. The 
analysis and the background of the institutional setting demonstrate that 
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nonstandard workers are not really contingent in the way that the term was 
originally understood. In order to elaborate on this, further research needs 
should include comparative analyses of different countries.
Two factors need to be considered in terms of limitations and 
 generalizability. First, the nonstandard workers described in this paper 
are involved in a triadic relationship. They are employed by means of 
 employment intermediaries, and may have a stronger position in the labour 
market than other nonstandard workers, such as direct-hired temporary 
workers. Many of these may have preferences for this type of work. The 
type of nonstandard workers included in this study should be taken into 
consideration if generalizing to other types of nonstandard work.
Second, in all three organizations, it was common to use agency 
 temporaries for recruitment purposes. Thus, these may be more dedicated 
workers than usual, having prospects of being recruited for regular positions 
in the client-organization. To be able to explore this further, one needs 
more information from agency temporaries, contract workers, and regu-
lar workers. Further research should also include organizations in which
temp-to-perm was less prevalent.
This study emphasizes one recent trend within the contracting and 
THAs-industry: the increasing use of high-skilled workers. It shows how 
client-organizations can be dependent on nonstandard workers. Examining 
the type of roles nonstandard workers play in their daily work enables us 
better understand the phenomenon.
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RÉSUMÉ
Le rôle des travailleurs atypiques dans les organisations clientes
Cet essai traite de la manière dont les organisations clientes utilisent 
les travailleurs qui sont recrutés par des agences d’emploi. Les observations 
montrent comment des agences temporaires et des travailleurs  d’entreprises 
à contrat soulèvent des dilemmes en termes de loyauté et de relations de 
pouvoir au sein des organisations clientes. L’étude est conduite dans un mar-
ché hautement réglementé, lequel offre un contexte nouveau à la littérature
actuelle traitant du travail atypique.
J’analyse ici un certain type de travailleurs atypiques, ceux qui sont 
recrutés par des agences d’emploi : (1) des travailleurs venant d’agences 
d’aide temporaire, qui sont à l’emploi d’une agence, mais supervisés par 
des organisations clientes ; (2) des travailleurs contractuels qui sont à l’em-
ploi d’une entreprise contractante et également supervisés par cette même 
entreprise. Contrairement à des travailleurs permanents, ils se retrouvent 
dans une relation triangulaire, leur employeur demeurant à l’extérieur de 
l’organisation cliente.
L’étude a recours à une approche qualitative pour analyser le rôle 
des travailleurs des agences d’aide temporaire et des travailleurs à contrat 
dans l’entreprise cliente. Les données proviennent d’entrevues effectuées 
principalement chez les dirigeants de trois entreprises. J’ai conduit les 
entrevues avec l’aide de 28 personnes dans les trois compagnies : Finance I, 
Finance II sont des compagnies du domaine de l’assurance employant 600 et
1000 personnes respectivement. L’assurance, les services bancaires et les 
produits d’investissement constituent leurs sphères principales d’activités. 
La portion des travailleurs syndiqués était de 70 % dans Finance I et de 55 % 
dans Finance II. Telecom était une entreprise de télécommunication non 
syndiquée fondée en 1996 et le nombre de ses employés s’élevait à 430.
L’étude a été conduite en Norvège, un contexte particulier à cause de 
son marché du travail qui est très réglementé et à cause de sa forte densité 
syndicale. La législation relativement sévère de protection de l’emploi (à 
cause de ses obstacles à la terminaison des contrats à durée indéterminée) 
laisse entendre que les employeurs préfèrent des contrats de travail à 
durée déterminée, qui sont moins coûteux à résilier. De plus, le régime de 
 sécurité sociale de la Norvège fournit aux travailleurs un accès important 
aux permissions d’absence, ce qui crée le besoin de remplacer les gens, par 
exemple, par du travail temporaire. Puisque tous les citoyens bénéficient de 
l’assurance-santé en Norvège, la possibilité d’économiser sur les avantages 
sociaux en recourrant à des travailleurs atypiques est de moindre importance 
que dans bien d’autres pays. La Norvège a un régime national d’avantages 
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en cas de maladie et tous les employés, incluant ceux des agences d’aide 
temporaire et des travailleurs à contrat, ont droit à une rémunération durant 
un congé de maladie.
L’étude révèle que les travailleurs à contrat et ceux des agences 
 temporaires sont retenus dans des activités vitales; ils sont fortement 
intégrés aux travailleurs permanents et parfois détiennent des positions 
stratégiques. Dans un tel contexte, les dirigeants exigent de la loyauté de la 
part des travailleurs atypiques et ces derniers sont en mesure de constituer 
des groupes de pression dans les organisations clientes. Ces observations 
peuvent se comprendre en référant à la relation d’emploi triadique. Puisque 
les travailleurs atypiques relèvent d’employeurs à l’extérieur des entreprises 
clientes, la direction des entreprises clientes doute parfois de leur loyauté. 
Également, la composition de cette main-d’œuvre exerce une influence 
sur la loyauté et le pouvoir potentiel des agences temporaires. Lorsque les 
travailleurs atypiques forment une partie importante de la main-d’œuvre, 
les enjeux de pouvoir et de loyauté deviennent plus prononcés.
En dépit du caractère distinct de cet environnement institutionnel, un 
nombre important de ces observations demeure congruent avec la littérature 
récente sur le travail atypique qu’on connaît dans le monde anglo-saxon. 
Cependant, même si des études comparatives devraient être effectuées pour 
arriver à des conclusions plus solides, ces similitudes indiquent que des 
employeurs dans des contextes institutionnels différents peuvent avoir des 
politiques semblables à l’endroit des travailleurs atypiques.
Les conclusions de cet essai corroborent celles de la littérature récente 
sur l’emploi atypique en montrant que des travailleurs atypiques ne sont pas 
toujours inférieurs et qu’ils ne refusent pas des assignations secondaires.
Le contexte institutionnel de la Norvège renforce cette conclusion. Puisque 
les avantages sociaux sont offerts sur une base universelle en Norvège, il 
existe peu de possibilité pour une entreprise d’économiser sur les coûts de 
main-d’œuvre. Ceci implique que les travailleurs atypiques, tels que ceux 
des agences temporaires et des entreprises sous-traitantes, touchent en 
principe les mêmes avantages que les travailleurs permanents, rendant les 
emplois ainsi occupés pas nécessairement « mauvais ». Cette constatation a 
une incidence sur la notion de travail atypique. L’analyse et l’environnement 
 institutionnel à l’arrière plan démontrent que les travailleurs atypiques ne 
sont pas vraiment aussi problématiques que le concept le laissait penser 
à l’origine. Pour être plus explicite sur ce point, un effort ultérieur de 
 recherche devrait inclure des analyses comparatives.
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